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From Authoritarianism to Upheaval: the Political Economy 
of the Syrian Uprising and Regime Persistence 
 
Housam DARWISHEH 
The ‘Syrian Spring’ began gradually in March 2011 but escalated into a violent conflict that drew in 
regional and international actors and variously competing opposition and regime forces. The 
ensuing bloodshed and deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Syria, the failure of the United Nations 
Security Council to reach a consensus on what action to take, as it did on Libya, and the 
involvement of contending external actors partially reflect the complexity of the current impasse. 
Despite the importance of regional and international factors, however, the domestic dynamics 
of the Syrian crisis have been vitally important in determining the course of the popular uprising and 
the regime’s response. In this, Syria’s crisis belongs with the Arab Spring the trajectories and 
prospects of which have been shaped by dynamics within regimes. By that I mean, the specificities 
of each Arab state considered in terms of state-building processes, and socioeconomic, political, 
and institutional structures. The formal and informal institutional structure of the Ba‘thist regime in 
Syria has been critical to its resilience and ability to stay united so far while attempting to crush a 
peaceful popular uprising that turned into insurgency in the face of the regime’s violent crackdown.  
The Syrian regime’s excessive repression of the opposition indicates that behind its security 
strategy and military operations the still united ruling coalition lacks political arrangements that can 
satisfactorily contain domestic challenges without endangering its own existence. Whereas Egypt’s 
regime was flexible and adaptable and its institutional structure allowed it much room to maneuver 
in an abruptly changed environment, the Syrian ruling coalition has been unable to deal with the 
uncertain consequences of making concessions to its opponents. Here, the Syrian regime’s 
responses to its deepening crisis will be examined in relation to the nature of civil-military relations, 
internal mechanisms of rule, and the core characteristics of regime-constructed power structures 
that included crucial ruling mechanisms and co-optation strategies. Moreover, in order to 
understand the Syrian uprising and its level of violence, now the highest in the Arab world, we need 
to know the basics of Syria’s history and the nature of state-society relations under the Asad rule.  
Historical Background  
Until its independence from France in 1946, Syria had never constituted a unified state or separate 
political entity. Syria had always been part of various empires or controlled by external rulers such 
as the Persians, Greeks and Romans. From 1516 to the end of World War I, Syria was part of the 
Ottoman Empire. The French and the British had promised to make Syria an independent kingdom 
after the Arab army defeated the Ottoman and captured Damascus. By the secret Sykes-Picot 
Agreement in 1916, however, the French and the British divided between them the provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire situated outside the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, in 1920, the League of Nations 
handed Syria and Lebanon as mandated territories over to France. 
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Between 1920 and 1946, the French prevented the development of the Syrian national 
community by dividing the country into several administrative and political units along regional 
and sectarian lines. The French also fostered sectarian, class and communal separatism, widening 
the gap between the majority Sunnis and various minorities by recruiting members of the Alawite 
and Druze minorities for its “Special Troupes of the Levant.”
1
 At independence, therefore, Syria 
lacked an exclusive central authority that could serve as a focus of identity and loyalty for the 
whole population; instead Syria was a geographical expression with no unified political identity or 
community.  
Syria’s troubled political and economic pre- and post-independence era and the defeat in the 
1948 Arab war with Israel intensified conflict between politicians and army officers who 
capitalized on popular discontent to legitimatize military takeovers.
2
 This accounts for a 
succession of military coups (more than 10 successful ones between 1949 and 1970) and the rising 
influence of various military factions in politics and power struggles. Post-independent instability 
and increasing polarization in the political system led the elites to dissolve the Syrian Arab 
Republic and create in 1958 a political union with Nasser’s Egypt, the United Arab Republic 
(UAR). The union collapsed in 1961, followed by the first Ba‘th military coup in 1963. Although 
it failed, the union was a turning point in modern Syria under which three important developments 
took place: (1) all political parties were banned; (2) a comprehensive agrarian reform law was 
introduced; and (3) socialist reforms were initiated through the nationalization of major sectors of 
the economy.
3
 In other words, the union accelerated the process of state expansion by exporting 
the Egyptian systems of economic and political management and laid the basis for consolidating 
one-party rule that used the state to advance development and block the formation of independent 
social, political or civil organizations.  
While the regime maintained its coercive power by restructuring the regime-military relations, 
it appeased popular discontent through promised wealth redistribution, populist platforms and the 
construction of a cross-class coalition. For example, the regime’s mobilization of the rural periphery 
by promising to raise agricultural productivity and social protection helped to secure its legitimacy 
and stability. To consolidate its power via a populist agenda, moreover, the Ba‘th Party capitalized 
on the rural-urban and class divides. In the pre-Ba‘th era, Syria’s rural regions as well as the urban 
poor and working classes were marginalized and powerless and, hence, unrepresented in the 
exclusively urban political arena. The marginalization and deprivation of the rural regions, however, 
was not only caused by the urban hold on wealth and power but also by rural fragmentation along 
clan, tribal, sect and village lines.
4
  
Originally, the Ba‘thist regime in Syria built its political power on mass rural mobilization and 
applying drastic socialist reforms. What was most transformed under the Ba‘th Party was the 
character of the ruling class: a new rural-based elite replaced the urban rich of Damascus and 
Aleppo who used to form the old regime. For its main support base, the Ba‘th Party recruited those 
who were outside the system of patronage and connections, such as rural professionals, teachers, 
doctors, students and minorities. The Ba‘thist campaigns of secularism, socialism, and Arab 
nationalism promised equitable income distribution and the reduction of inequalities between the 
periphery and center and between rich and poor. Yet one outcome was sectarian mobilization among 
depressed groups who benefited from the reduction of inequalities as well as upward mobility 
mainly among the minorities.   
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By redistributing power and resources to the agricultural communities, the Ba‘thist regime 
broke the power of the old elite and destroyed their control over land and the market. This was 
further advanced by a socialist transformation that replaced capitalist and feudal relations of 
production in the countryside with redistributive land reforms, public land distribution and other 
forms of cooperative and collective organizations of rural populations. The promise of 
egalitarianism through a modernizing agrarian ‘revolution’ was the pillar on which the Ba‘th Party 
legitimized its rule and institutionalized the state’s links with peasants, farmers and the working 
class. Moreover, the nationalization of industry and commerce decisively transformed power and 
social structures, bringing the economy fully under state control. Following a non-capitalist road to 
development, Syria under the Ba‘thist regime established a privileged relationship with the 
Communist bloc. The early stage of Ba‘thist rule was very much pro-rural and 
anti-cosmopolitan/urban which alienated the urban bourgeoisie, upper middle class and the 
traditional religious establishment.  
The planned course of radical social transformation, however, took a different path after 
Syria’s decisive defeat in the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 and Israel’s capture and annexation of 
the Golan Heights. The defeat exacerbated a split within the Ba‘th Party: reformists/pragmatists led 
by Hafiz al-Asad differed with radicals led by Salah Jadid on how to deal with the consequences of 
war. The reformist wing, which had a strong base in the military, held that radical Ba‘thist reforms 
undermined national unity, increased Syria’s regional isolation and provoked military escalation by 
Israel and the West.
5
 Thus, Asad’s coup of 1970, dubbed “the Corrective Movement,” removed the 
radicals from key positions in the party and state institutions, and maintained the broad lines of the 
Ba‘thist program. By being more moderate and less ideological the Asad camp paved the way for 
new regional, economic and political shifts that consolidated Asad’s rule and prevented the 
recurrence of military coups, institutional factionalism, and wars with Israel. 
 
Asad’s Consolidation of Power  
Asad’s rise to power represented a turning point in the process of the regime formation and power 
consolidation of the Ba‘th Party. As Brownlee argued, strong parties arise from the decisive victory 
of one elite faction over all others during the initial formation of an authoritarian regime.
6
 The 
cornerstone of Asad’s regime consolidation involved an end to the factionalism and competition for 
political power that had marked Syrian politics since independence and Ba‘th rule between 1963 
and the 1970s. Asad’s control of the party and his ability to hold the elites together and provide 
mechanisms for long-term political security preempted future party factionalism. He filled the party 
and security apparatuses with loyal members of his clan and built patronage networks with other 
minorities, like the Druze and Christians. He also co-opted key military Sunni families to contain 
dissent within the military.  
As in other post-colonial Arab republics, Asad built organizations through which he could 
mobilize and channel regime supporters. Unlike other Arab states, however, state and party 
expanded and merged in Syria to the extent that they were hardly distinguishable. Asad 
transformed a divided political society and a weak state identity by constructing a cohesive 
structure of power. At its base, inclusive policies mobilized cross-sectarian and rural-urban 
constituencies. At the top level, loyalists and Alawi officers gathered around the president 
   
 4 
‘combined privileged access to him with positions in the party and control of the levers of 
coercion. They were, therefore, in an unrivalled position to act as political brokers and, especially 
in times of crisis, were uniquely placed to shape outcomes.’
7
 Sectarianism alone did not secure elite 
cohesion. Rather, the socioeconomic make-up of the then newly emerging minoritarian regime 
allowed for cohesion among its members. As Batatu notes ‘whereas the Alawite officers were 
overwhelmingly of rural origins, peasant extraction, common regional provenance… the Sunni 
officers were hopelessly divided in political, regional and class terms’.
8
  
On the economic front, Asad strengthened his regime by co-opting key business families and 
allowing the urban merchant class and the private sector some degree of access to the system to 
moderate the urban-rural conflict caused by the radical Ba‘thist policies of the 1960s. He achieved 
this by changing the agrarian reform law and advancing limited economic liberalization under 
state-led growth.
9
 In short, the regime establish its control via a constellation of personal relations, 
formal and informal institutional structures and patronage networks that linked society to the state 
by inclusionary and exclusionary strategies. 
The regime’s legal control of state institutions was enshrined in the 1973 constitution which 
granted the Ba‘th Party the sole position of leading state and society. According to the constitution, 
the president must be nominated by the leadership of the Ba‘th Party, endorsed by parliament, and 
then approved by a majority in a national referendum. Nationwide Ba‘thist mobilization was 
enhanced by constructing national projects and dams that created electricity and advanced irrigation. 
Asad’s control was extended by the massive expansion of the state bureaucracy and military 
intelligence services which, together with economic distribution, was made possible by foreign aid 
after 1973 and the subsequent dramatic increase of oil prices. As it were, society was turned into an 
enlarged regime having popular organizations, such as peasant and trade unions that were directly 
linked to the Ba‘th Party and enforced loyalty and the implementation of government directives.
10
  
The resultant social and economic networks were also networks of political surveillance and 
social control whose innumerable informants kept the populace obedient to the regime. Batatu’s 
depiction of Asad’s power structure identifies four levels with distinct characteristics:  
First, Asad’s undisputable authority to the general direction of policy and to the 
questions crucial to his regime, such as security, intelligence, military and foreign 
affairs; second, unpublicized chiefs of the multiple intelligence and security networks 
which function independently from one another, enjoy broad latitude and keep a close 
watch on everything in the country that is of concern to his regime. On same second 
level, and also answerable to Asad, are the commanders of the politically relevant, 
regime shielding, coup deterring, elite armed formations, such as the Republican 
Guard, the Special Forces, the Third Armored Division, and before 1984, the Defense 
Companies. It is these formations, which alone are allowed in the capital, that 
constitute the essential underpinning of his power and not the regular armed forces; 
third, the Ba‘th Party command, whose Secretary General is Asad, serves as a 
consultative body for Asad and at the same time watches, through the party machine, 
over the proper implementation of his policies by the elements on the fourth level, 
namely the ministers, the higher bureaucrats, the provincial governors, the members 
of the executive boards of the local councils, and the leaders of the party’s ancillary 
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mass organizations and their subordinate organs.
11
  
The regime’s broad social ‘coalition’, though, began to be diminished in the mid-1980s as the 
state economy failed to generate enough domestic resources for populist policies during several 
economic crises in the 1980s. As the regime fell short of revenue, it responded in two different ways. 
It introduced privatization to mobilize private capital and it loosened the state’s grip over the market 
with limited liberalization. The regime’s strategy was to progressively extend and shift its patronage 
networks to the private sector while controlling access to resources and the market in order to 
restrict and limit privatization to selected members and organizations.
12
 Unlike Anwar Sadat who 
changed the political system when he initiated political pluralism and economic liberalization in 
Egypt in the 1970s, Asad preferred remodeling the system to preserve his ability to create, co-opt 
and control the newly rising business community.   
The remodeling of the regime’s socio-political base was introduced in the 1990 elections when 
parliament was first open to independent, non-party candidates. From a total of 250 parliamentary 
seats, Hafez al-Asad allocated 82 to non-party members. Thus, the regime could extend its 
patronage networks to the business and commercial elites but also reach out to the religious 
community by giving a number of pro-regime Sunni ‘ulama parliamentary seats and access to 
official institutions and media and allowing them to form nationwide religious networks of schools 
and charity organizations.
13
 But economic liberalization and selective tolerance of the religious 
sphere was not accompanied by meaningful political liberalization, such as the creation of a 
political party that could openly take responsibility for the regime’s reform process. Indeed, not 
economic imperatives alone but political motives of continued survival under changing conditions 
drove the regime’s turn to economic liberalization. Thus, whereas populist measures ‘justified’ 
authoritarianism at the moment of Asad’s ascent to power, authoritarianism likewise ‘justified’ 
economic liberalization for the small privileged elite circles that formed around the president. 
In the short term, Hafez al-Asad’s economic liberalization was manageable thanks to aid from 
the Arab Gulf, other forms of foreign assistance and oil revenues, which supported the regime’s 
budget and autonomy from the 1980s to the early 1990s. Yet economic liberalization significantly 
aggravated Syria’s economic problems as the government later exhausted its revenue. The end of 
the Cold War compelled the former Soviet Union’s Middle East clients, including Syria, to turn to 
other sources of aid. Hence, in 1990, the regime allied itself with the UN-sponsored force to liberate 
Kuwait from Iraq. This brought large-scale Western aid which likewise followed Syria’s efforts to 
play a role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and influence Lebanon’s domestic politics.  
When it was formed, the state under Asad was defined by its capacity to penetrate society and 
regulate social relations through the Ba‘th Party’s domination of state institutions. However, the 
state’s declining ability to extract enough revenues to sustain populist policies diminished the 
regime’s social coalition. Although economic liberalization did not weaken the regime’s control, it 
undermined its capacity for social mobilization as the Ba’th Party’s role shifted towards developing 
patronage networks with the business community. No matter how irrelevant to social mobilization 
the Ba‘th Party became, its organizational reach was instrumental in providing information for 
political surveillance and the control of opposition elements and civil society at large. Yet, as the 
party’s role was steadily changed from social mobilization to political surveillance it exacerbated 
resentment in its former rural base and led an increasingly alienated youth to regard the regime as a 
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mere repressive machine that could only be challenged by mass protest, as had happened in 
neighboring countries.   
 
The Rural Base of the Syrian Protest Movement: Bringing Back the Old Regime  
If the regime still kept control of state institutions and society, it did not compensate for the 
reduction of its social base by permitting a changing socioeconomic order to express itself; nor did it 
allow the emergence of civil society organizations to address deteriorating socioeconomic 
conditions. Having apparently lost its capacity for social mobilization and networking, the regime 
chose to bolster its alliance with the new bourgeoisie, particularly with influential commercial and 
business segments and families close to the regime. 
Many observers were surprised when the protest movement began in Dar’a, a former Ba‘thist 
stronghold that had benefited from the Ba‘th land reforms, employment and high posts in 
government. However, the Ba‘thist social contract unraveled with the declining ability of the public 
sector to provide employment. This setback coincided with the rapid decline in oil reserves, and the 
loss of job opportunities in Lebanon after Syria was forced to withdraw its troops from Lebanon in 
2006 following the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafki Hariri.
14
 
It was also a blow to the regime’s long-term survival because of Lebanon’s importance to Syria’s 
economy and the financial benefits from the Lebanese black market many Syrian officials had 
enjoyed for decades. In other words, a formerly loyal constituency was turning recalcitrant.  
Climate change also unexpectedly eroded the legitimacy of the regime. Waves of drought 
caused severe rural poverty and sparked massive rural-urban migration, generating unprecedented 
polarization between urban and rural areas and between the haves and have-nots, a situation that did 
not exist in Syria before. A demographic transition shaped by rapid urbanization and internal 
migration, exacerbated by streams of refugees from Iraq, put further pressure on the state’s ability to 
provide services such as housing, clean water and health. Whereas large cities such as Damascus 
and Aleppo with relatively developed infrastructure could absorb waves of migrants, 
underdeveloped cities, such as Dar’a, Hama and Homs, suffered deterioration of already poor 
conditions. 
The severe drought since 2006 exacerbated water scarcity in the northeast region where about 
95 percent of the population affected by water scarcity lives. In 2010, the World Food Program 
(WFP) started to distribute emergency food packages to more than 200,000 people in Raqqa, Deir 
Ezzor and Hasaka, three vast semi-arid provinces in eastern Syria that were once the nation’s 
breadbasket. Much of the affected population urgently needed help, but foreign funds were lacking 
because political tension between Syria and the United States led to cutbacks in aid programs.
15
 The 
WFP measures could neither mitigate the losses of livestock nor preserve the food security of 
herders and their families living in the Syrian Steppe.
16
  
Syria had suffered from waves of drought since 1990, but thanks to government subsides, 
farmers were able to withstand short-term droughts. But the drought of 2006–2010, the longest and 
worst in Syria’s modern history, coincided with the erosion of state subsidies to make agricultural 
communities highly vulnerable.
17
 The drought and the government’s lack of interest in addressing 
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its consequences drove the majority of people from these areas towards the interior governorates, 
mainly Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Dar’a. As it was, internal migration produced many 
humanitarian, social and health problems. For example, school enrolment has fallen while dropout 
rates have risen since 2008. According to a UN needs assessment, enrolment in some schools in 
eastern Syria has fallen by 70 to 80 percent. 
The rural areas also suffered from the negative impact of the Ba‘thist regime’s populist 
policies which stressed the cultivation of certain crops that required an enormous amount of water. 
Those policies were related to the regime strategy of enhancing national security by attaining 
self-sufficiency in wheat and cotton, the most ‘strategic’ but high water-consuming crops. Yet, very 
little was done to manage irrigation sustainably. Excessive irrigation raised the salinity of the soil 
and aggravated the effects of the drought.
18
 Policy mismanagement and lack of urgent government 
planning contributed to the inability of the agricultural system to cope with the drought and its 
aftermath. Economic liberalization reduced subsidies for basic commodities such as diesel fuel 
which increased the cost of pumping irrigation water and transporting products to market. The 
overall impact of the regime’s failure to confront water-related challenges pushed famers and their 
communities deeper into poverty. The demographic transition meant that the social structure was 
changing significantly while the old social contract that promised food security and socioeconomic 
stability was no longer valid. With all that, the regime’s base of support and ‘legitimacy’ were 
crumbling.   
Externally, Bashar al-Asad’s continued support for Hezbollah and Hamas, his strong stance 
against American aggression in Iraq in 2003 and Syria’s acceptance of more than 1.5 million Iraqi 
refugees gained him more power within Syria and the region. On the whole, the regime was 
struggling to avoid regional isolation caused by the regime change in Iraq and the loss of Syrian 
control over Lebanon. The regime sought to use the presence of Iraqi refugees to deter the USA 
from destabilizing its rule, and force it to engage on other domestic and regional issues. In addition 
the regime hoped to deepen its influence in Iraq or even demonstrate to the Syrian people the heavy 
cost of the ‘Iraqi model’.
19
 But the open border policy towards Iraqi refugees, however, had 
negative domestic impacts – homelessness, inflation, food and rent prices, unemployment, and 
economic inequalities all increased. These socioeconomic problems caused considerable instability, 
creating a domestic crisis for the regime without ending Syria’s regional and international isolation.  
 
Understanding Regime Resilience and its Limits 
The erosion of its traditional constituencies practically condemned the regime to follow the trends 
set in Tunisia and Egypt. However, Asad has turned the formal and informal power structures to his 
advantage. The complex intertwined power relations in the regime and its strong and organically 
connected ruling establishment has enabled the regime to maintain elite cohesion and minimize 
institutional defection. The informal power structures in the intelligence units, special military 
forces and the Ba‘th Party make the regime less constrained by formal state institutions. 
Consequently, whereas other regimes in the region quelled domestic upheavals by working out new 
elite and opposition bargains, the Syrian regime seems resilient even if it lacks such options of 
adaptation essential in crises. The ruling coalition has accordingly regarded security measures as the 
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only bulwark against regime disintegration, leaving the regime to face an opposition it can neither 
co-opt nor crush.  
How can we account for such regime resilience? Why, for instance, did the Syrian regime not 
follow the example of Egypt where the military establishment replaced the presidential institution 
or used its power to avoid the disintegration of the regime? Here, institutional level analysis is 
needed to understand the Asad regime’s resilience and structural intransigence.  
Regime-Level Explanation: Civil-military relations 
Egypt’s civil-military dynamics are illuminating when contrasted with those in Syria. Although the 
military establishment in Egypt used to be considered the backbone of the regime after the Free 
Officers overthrew the monarchy in 1952, the military had not played a direct political role in 
Egyptian politics and regime preservation since the early 1970s. The military establishment was 
politically marginalized after its defeat in 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The depoliticization of the military 
accelerated after Sadat came to power in 1970 with the ‘demilitarization’ of the Cabinet and 
bureaucracy – their ranks were filled with civilian technocrats – and the liberalization of parts of the 
state-owned and military-controlled public sector.
20
 The political neutralization of the military 
enhanced its professional image, as if it was the servant of the state rather than the regime.
21
 
Significantly, just as limited political ‘pluralism’ was introduced the ruling National Democratic 
Party served as the main vehicle of elite co-optation while the presidency was omnipotent. 
Egypt’s homogenous society, virtually free of significant ethnic or sectarian cleavages, 
relieved the regime from seeking mass mobilization by institution expansion that required the ruling 
party to penetrate the coercive apparatus and bureaucracy. This allowed the ruler in Egypt to offer 
some semblance of political freedom while ‘power was still heavily concentrated in the hands of the 
president’.
22
 Nor did the regime have to adhere to populist and nationalist ideologies to maintain its 
legitimacy. The regime could set its rules of electoral participation to co-opt important opposition 
elements, such as the Islamists, suppressed and yet allowed to participate in the political process as 
long as they abided by the regime’s rules. Meanwhile, the presidency was the pinnacle of power 
with almost the only constraint on executive authority in Egypt coming from external quarters such 
as the USA and international financial institutions (mainly the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund).
23
 And while Egypt’s presidency represented centralized authority, it used the 
National Democratic Party to extend economic and political networks of patronage and co-opt the 
elite and opposition. 
In Syria, the regime counts on a wider set of state institutions with more power-sharing 
mechanisms and a larger scope of co-optation. As Hinnebusch notes, the Ba‘th Party and the 
presidency share power that rests on three overlapping pillars: ‘the party apparatus, the 
military-police establishment and the ministerial bureaucracy. Through these interlocking 
institutions, the top political elite seeks to settle intra-elite conflicts and design public policy, and 
through their command posts, to implement policy and control society’.
24
 The Ba‘th Party 
apparatus penetrates all state institutions and civil society organizations while the party’s military 
organization exercises political control over its military members.
25
 Hence, the ruling coalition and 
the political system in Syria are far more institutionally interlocked than their counterparts in other 
authoritarian Arab regimes. As such, preserving the integrity of the coalition becomes critical to the 
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survival of the regime and its institutions.  
To survive in such a structure, other institutions also strive to maintain their co-optative 
capacity. Thus, elite co-optation is not the burden of the ruling party alone, as in Egypt, but an onus 
on all state institutions that must directly recruit support for the regime. In short, the regime 
‘overcomes’ the heterogeneity of Syrian society and opposition by creating its opposite – a cohesive 
unitary regime. Such a coalition makes it difficult for anyone to attempt a coup without risking his 
own survival. This explains why the ‘Egyptian scenario’ has been unavailable to Syria over the past 
18 months of unrest, and why no state institution has attempted to take over the presidency to ride 
out the crisis. 
Another crucial feature of regime cohesion is the unquestioning support the regime receives 
from the coercive apparatus and the ruling inner circle, a highly sectarian institution that is tightly 
controlled and represented by the Asad clan. This has been ensured by the presence of highly trained 
and loyal units inside the military and the security services, such as the Republican Guard and the 
Fourth Armored Division. Their carefully selected leaders are commanded by officers who belong 
to the president’s own family and clans such as the Makhloufs and Shaleeshs.
26
 Indeed all key posts 
in the military and security services are controlled by closely related families. For instance, the 
president’s brother, Maher, commands the Republican Guard (an elite force whose six brigades 
protect the regime from domestic threats) and heads the fourth armed division (one of the army’s 
best equipped and most highly trained forces). The president’s brother-in-law Asef Shawkat, who 
was killed in a bomb blast in July 2012, was the former commander of the intelligence agency and 
deputy Chief of Staff of the Syrian military.  
In the past decade, the concentration of power in Bashar al-Asad’s inner core had been 
accompanied by the regime’s growing dependence on security services for state control. Moreover, 
as the majority of defecting soldiers during the current unrest are Sunni, more and more Alawites 
are forcibly brought in, and the elite army units practically act as Alawite militias. Some Alawites 
oppose the regime’s brutal suppression. Still, the fate of these militias is bound up with the survival 
of the regime because they fear reprisals should the regime fall. Their fear has prompted the rise of 
the initially armed Alawite youths, Shabbiha, who became the vanguard of the regime’s response to 
dissent. It would take more than the overthrow of the president for the regime to fall: it would 
require the disintegration of those highly trained and equipped army units. But with the 
institutionalized state threatened with disintegration, the ruling elites find themselves even less 
prepared or willing to make political compromises that could end the violence.  
The Significance of Political Economy 
Building a cohesive business class/private sector was another important pillar of regime resilience. 
Selective liberalization kept the influential business class totally dependent on its relationship with 
state officials for benefits and privileged contracts. At the Ba‘th’s Tenth Regional Command 
Conference in 2005, Bashshar sought to counter the eroding populist policies and the declining role 
of the public sector with ‘socialist market economy’. However, the ‘socialist’ infitah, which ended 
decades of socialism and gave entrepreneurs easy access to the economy, challenged the regime’s 
traditional economic, political and ideological legacy. The high unemployment rate, housing crisis 
and the spread of urban slums became a time bomb that threatened security and stability.
27
 With the 
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regime’s traditional constituency and state institutions exposed to market forces, the established 
alliance between the regime and the peasants and workers was sorely strained. 
Instead a newly empowered mafia-like alliance of pro-regime capitalists and bureaucrats 
emerged as the principal beneficiary of patronage. These new social climbers have become the 
target of animosity among the less privileged classes in a country where extravagant displays of 
wealth were unknown in recent memory.
28
 Even though the regime had to yield some important 
components of its political legitimacy – collective ideology and egalitarian policies – the regime 
would not open up the political system. Rather social alliances were shifting under authoritarian rule, 
as Salwa Ismail observes: 
families and clans tied to the regime have become major economic actors. For 
instance, Rami Makhlouf, the president’s maternal cousin, has a virtual monopoly 
over mobile phone services, the running of the duty free markets on Syria’s borders, 
the country’s top private English language school, sole representation of Schindler 
elevators and various restaurant chains. Others, who enjoyed similar privileges, 
include the son of Mustafa Tlas, sons of ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, the son of Bahjat 
Sulaiman (the head of the internal security until June 2005), the Shalishes (cousins of 
the president) and other immediate members of the Asad family as well as members 
of the extended clan.
29
 
Thus, the networks of patronage have been narrowed down to influential families rather than 
party members. It is no wonder then that Rami Makhlouf was the focus of the current protest 
movement in its early stage which forced the regime to state that Makhouf had quit business and 
channeled his wealth into charity and development projects. Even so, as Perthes comments: 
A combination of political incapacitation and de-politicization, open repression, and 
selective incorporation, the regime has managed to keep the civil-society threat at 
bay… as long as the security architecture holds, alternative power centers cannot 
merge, clientelism continues to fragment key societal groups, discontent remains 
unorganized, and social demands can be dealt with selectively; the ability of the 
regime to act, by and large, on its own preferences is not in question.
30
  
In addition, the select rich urban bourgeoisie, the Sunni Damascene in particular, now has a 
direct interest in preserving stability and their relations with the regime as long as their businesses 
prosper.
31
 The regime’s selective liberalization had created a cohesive business class that is 
organically linked with the regime. According to Bassam Haddad four levels of state bourgeoisie 
dominate and control the state economy and extend their patronage networks into the public and 
private sectors. The first and most powerful segment of the state economic elite is drawn mainly 
from the ranks of the top regime leadership and these individuals who are united by their direct 
relations with the ruling family. Although these individuals control the public sectors such as oil, 
they largely derive their wealth from relatively recent entries into lucrative private sector markets, 
including those of communication, information technology, car dealerships and the free market 
zones that were liberalized and expanded in 2003. The second most powerful level of state 
bourgeoisie belongs to the army and security services. This category includes top generals and 
heads of the nine major security apparatuses, their deputies, underlings and former heads of security. 
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These individuals have parlayed coercive power, and, in some cases, their institutional positions 
into considerable wealth. Most of their offspring have opted for private careers since the mid- to late 
1990s, and they form a significant familial power and financial bloc among the state bourgeoisie. 
Hence, it is difficult to separate between the public and the private sectors. The third category 
comprises the administrative and bureaucratic sectors. Within this category are several hundred top 
civil servants, Cabinet members and their deputies, provincial governors and high-profile mayors, 
and heads of labor and peasant unions. These people have been steadily moving into the private 
sector. The fourth category is made up of former and current high-level economic public sector 
managers and bureaucrats who have most successfully entered the private sector and can compete 
effectively given their ties to the core elite.
32
  
Therefore, the public sector has been transformed into a cohesive private sector whose 
members, too, shelter under the umbrella of the regime and cannot survive without the protection of 
the state apparatuses. In a sense, the regime did not spawn a new business class, as had emerged in 
Egypt with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his associates. The lack of alterative avenues has made 
businesses dependent on the regime and thus loyal to it. Besides, the regime’s intentional policy of 
avoidance of commercial linkages with the institutions of international capitalism has likewise 
maintained an alliance of the business class with the regime and state officials. This alliance seems 
to have endured: Damascus and Aleppo were largely immune to unrest until the Free Syrian Army 
moved its battle to urban cities.  
The corrosive social effects of these changes of political economy had in fact been seen in the 
‘mid-decade outbreak of several localized sectarian/tribal conflicts, which manifested an erosion of 
the regime control’ before the current unrest began.
33
 Ironically the onset of the uprising in 2011 
recalled the pre-Ba‘thist period when the rural regions were deprived and marginalized and 
regime-connected figures and beneficiaries dominated the economy and benefitted from the 
political and economic arrangements that advocated urban development at the expense of the 
countryside. 
 
Making Sense of the Ongoing Violence in Syria 
To understand the current violence in Syria, one has to think about the nature of state violence 
against the population in the four preceding decades. Violence has been an essential tool of 
Ba‘thist rule, mostly under the Asad family. Since the ascendance of the Ba‘th party in 1963, Syria 
has been under emergency rule which suspends all rights and liberties. How Asad maintains his 
rule may be illustrated by two example of regime violence – the Hama massacre of 1982 and the 
existence of “incommunicado” detention centers and military prisons where torture, ill treatment 
and dehumanizing conditions are widespread.
34
  
Everyone in Syria, regardless of sect or race, whether activist, Islamist or not, is in danger of 
physical disappearance once he/she utters anything in opposition to the political or ideological 
orientation of the Ba‘thist regime or discusses the freedom of expression. As it were, a permanent 
state of war exists between the regime and the opposition such that the current violence is akin to 
a continuation of war that existed beneath forty years of “stability and peace” under the Asad rule. 
The regime’s response to the uprising and the demands of the people since March 2011 displays 
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the same mentality that caused the regime to crush the opposition to its rule in Hama in 1982 by 
totally destroying the city and massacring its population. A similar scenario looms but this time it 
involves larger and geographically more dispersed segments of the population. Under Asad’s 
“peace and stability”, hundreds of thousands were tortured and kept in detention centers. 
Thousands “disappeared” before the 2011 uprising. With that the regime set the rules of its power 
relations vis-à-vis the Syrian population and practically destroyed any prospect for the emergence 
of political society in Syria. By institutionalizing violence the regime polarized the people 
between those wholly loyal and totally submissive, and the opposition. In other words, the Arab 
Spring might have been the trigger for the current uprising but even more so it could have been 
the regime’s initial reaction of torturing and killing the children who wrote graffiti against Asad 
rule on the walls of their school. The uprising was sparked by the defiance of any further 
dehumanization of the population.  
As with the other movements of the Arab Spring, the Syrian uprising began peacefully and 
remained so for more than four months. But the Syrian regime took two lessons from the uprisings 
elsewhere. The regime considered, first, that the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes were too slow in 
confronting the protestors, and, second, the peaceful nature of the protest movements gained great 
momentum, delegitimized the use of force against them, and thereby attracted millions of 
participants. To that extent, the Syrian regime perversely regarded the peaceful character of its 
domestic uprising to be most dangerous because it channeled new blood and force, even among 
those who had very little to do with politics, into a newly emerging political society. Drawing 
strength from its peacefulness and legitimate demands against corruption and authoritarianism, the 
uprising attracted people from all sects and classes of Syrian society and spread to a larger 
geographical setting. Some of the protestors’ best remembered slogans were “One, one, one – the 
Syrian people are one” and “peaceful, peaceful… even if they (security forces) killed every day 
one hundred of us!” 
The security forces lost their patience with a non-violent protest movement that delegitimized 
the use of force against the people. The regime resorted to using two tactics. First, its official 
propaganda raised the specter of sectarianism by highlighting armed gangs, Salafi militants and 
foreign conspiracies, and spread rumors of sectarian attacks among various communities in 
villages and cities.  Second, the regime militarized the uprising by using excessive violence in 
order to justify large-scale military operations and discourage the opposition from joining the 
protest movement. By doing so, the regime was able to push part of the protest into the field most 
familiar to the regime: military confrontation. As a result of the militarization, the regime made its 
own survival the only guarantee of regional stability. The protracted stalemate invited regional 
mobilization and soon regional actors exercised their financial and military influence in Syria by 
supporting different armed groups in pursuit of their own interests. Consequently, the Syrian 
problem has become a regional one and the Asad regime ceased to be seen as the only cause of 
regional instability. This situation undercut the initial demands of the popular uprising while 
regional and international support was channeled to armed groups on the ground. The escalation 
of violence has caused a huge humanitarian crisis in Syria and neighboring countries. By now, 
more than 40,000 people have been killed, more than 40,000 people “disappeared” and hundreds 
of thousands injured. Millions have been displaced and there are now hundreds of thousands of 
refugees. Daily the state infrastructure is damaged and villages and cities are destroyed. With the 
militarization of the Syrian crisis, the opposing forces will hardly understand the language of 
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political transition to democracy in the years to come. 
The existing power structure, which made the Syrian regime resilient and sustained its 
cohesion so far, simultaneously constrains its scope for reform and its ability to formulate political 
arrangements that can urgently respond to domestic challenges without waging a war against its 
opponents and society at large. The dilemma is that the security strategy cannot offer a workable 
solution to the current crisis in which a struggle for survival continues in Syria’s main cities of 
Aleppo and Damascus. Indiscriminate regime crackdowns have forced members of Syrian society 
into learning how to defend themselves and to cross social, economic and communal boundaries. 
However, the performance of the external political opposition and its fragmentation are a cause for 
concern if the opposition were to play any essential role in a post-Asad transition. The opposition 
has so far failed to unite around a political program for post-Asad Syria. In the end, it is not only 
about toppling a regime but also about uprooting the current system which “is based on keeping 
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